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I 
Abstract 
The electoral gains of the radical right in Europe have been remarkable during recent years. 
There is not one single cause explaining the phenomenon but scholars are to a great extent 
agreeing on the fact that convergence between mainstream left and right parties has had an 
excessive impact on the success of the family. The sociocultural policy dimension has been 
gaining more attention in research as it is seen as the primary basis for these new parties. 
Drawing on theories on party competition and political opportunity structures this study seek to 
study policy positions and reanalyse (with an inclusion of a sociocultural dimension) the question 
of whether convergence of positions held by mainstream left and right parties can explain 
variation in success of radical right parties in Western Europe. Looking at recent time variant 
cross-country data and using a two-step approach the study first explores the relationship 
between distance on party positioning of mainstream parties in Western Europe and the 
likelihood of a country having a radical right party. At second it explores the relationship between 
mainstream party positioning and electoral success of the radical right parties. Distance on party 
positioning is measured on a left-right economic dimension and a left-right sociocultural 
dimension. The findings do not give proof to the convergence theory. Looking at the positioning 
at sociocultural dimension it rather it shows the opposite. The main finding is that, the more to 
the right mainstream right parties are positioned on the sociocultural dimension the higher 
electoral support for the radical right.   
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1. Introduction 
There is a so called “populist movement” in Europe (Mudde 2016, October 22), radical right 
parties are no longer outsiders and have thus become important players in the political landscape. 
The rise has been remarkable and even in, for example Sweden, which was long seen as a case in 
which the radical right had failed to mobilize, the radical right party Sweden Democrats (SD) in 
the 2010 election, was elected to the Swedish Riksdag with 5.7 per cent of the vote. In 2014, with 
12.86 per cent of the vote, the party doubled its score and became the third biggest party in 
parliament (Valmyndigheten 2016). A similar development applies for numerous radical right 
parties in European countries such as Austria, France, Denmark, Finland and others. In fact, the 
radical right is the most successful emerging party family in post-war Europe (Mudde 2014:1).  
The electoral gains of the radical right around Europe have been covered extensively among 
political scientists and sociologists, but still the demand for research on the topic has not been 
reduced. There is still substantial interest among media and society to understand which factors 
drive the electoral success of the radical right. Scholars are eager to fill the demand for 
explanations to questions such as, how come radical right parties succeed in some countries while 
they fail in others?  
There is no unanimous answer to what explains variation in the success of the radical right. It is 
not a single-issue phenomenon that can be understood only as a response to the economic crisis 
or the influx of immigrants from non-European regions (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). In a 
majority of previous research, focus has been on demand-side explanations, socioeconomic 
conditions and factors that shape voters’ preferences. Nevertheless, several recent studies (eg. 
Van der Brug, et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Meguid 2005) have provided evidence that 
the explanations to the electoral success of these parties are rather to be found on the supply-side 
of the equation.  
This study takes its point of departure in the concept of political opportunity structures and the 
convergence of party positions between mainstream parties. Mudde (2016, October 22) argues 
that the convergence between mainstream left and right parties has created a “fertile breeding 
ground for populism” since the voters see these parties as being all the same. In general, there 
seems to be an agreement among scholars that convergence between the major mainstream left 
and right parties opens up a space for radical right parties to emerge. However, many studies 
testing the convergence hypothesis have only measured convergence on one dimension, mostly 
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left-right positions on economic issues and not left-right positions on sociocultural issues even 
though political competition between parties takes place on multiple issue dimensions (Rovny 
2013).  
Interestingly, recently published case studies (Loxbo 2014; Oskarson and Demker 2015) found 
that convergence does in fact matter more on the sociocultural dimension than on the traditional 
left-right economic. In light of such considerations, there is reason to investigate party positions 
on the sociocultural dimension more closely in combination with applying a cross-national 
comparative approach.  
The thesis will study the concept of convergence of political parties’ policy positions and how it 
affects the success of the radical right. A quantitative method will be used in order to analyse 
expert placements of mainstream political parties. The analysis contains a two-step approach and 
at first, it explores the relationship between distance on party positioning of mainstream parties in 
Western Europe and the likelihood of a country having a radical right party. At second it explores 
the relationship between distance on the party positioning of mainstream parties and electoral 
success of the radical right parties. Distance on party positioning is measured on a left-right 
economic dimension and a left-right sociocultural dimension. The cross-national time series data 
on party positioning is derived from the Chapel Hill expert surveys and covers five waves of 
surveys (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014).  
As pointed out by Mudde (2016, October 22) coalition governments, so called “cordon sanitaire” 
are created around Europe in order to curb radical right parties. These are created with the aim of 
excluding radical right parties but they may also have an unintended effect of recreating the 
conditions that led to the success of the radical right party in the very first place.  Hence, I do 
believe that if we would like to see a changed development, research on the phenomenon of 
mainstream parties convergence is of especially high importance from a societal perspective. 
 
1.2 Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided up into seven major sections. In the following chapter, definitional issues 
and main concepts of the radical right are discussed. Moreover research that is relevant for the 
understanding of, and continued work on, the presented research topic and question is 
introduced. The third section outlines the aim and research question. The fourth section 
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introduces the theoretical framework on spatial theory and political opportunity structures and 
derives five hypotheses.  Section five, the methods section, discusses the data sources, 
operationalizes the concepts and presents the statistical models that will be used to test the 
theoretical claim. The sixth part tests the hypotheses and presents the results of the analyses. In 
the last section, concluding remarks will be made, implications of potential findings will be 
discussed and suggestions for further research will be provided.   
  
2. Previous research 
This section presents the research field and situates this thesis in it. It covers both definitions of 
main concepts, and relevant studies of convergence of party positions. In the first section some 
definitional issues on the radical right will be discussed. The following subsections are devoted to 
present previous research on the concept of political opportunity structures and convergence of 
party positions and thereafter, previous studies on the importance of the sociocultural dimension. 
These sections are highly interlinked with the core theoretical framework of Downs (1957) 
Kitschelt (1994,1995, 2004) and Meguid (2005) introduced more in detail in the theory section. 
The final subsection discusses the identified research gaps the analysis aims to address.  
 
2.1 Definitional issues 
In the early 1980’s radical right parties started to emerge in Europe and created a new party 
family. This raised questions such as - who belongs in the family and what are we actually talking 
about?  
To begin with, it is important to point out that the terminology used to define the radical right 
parties differs among scholars. As pointed out by Ennser (2012:157) its difficult to agree on a 
label when the definition of the objects to be classified under that label is missing. Scholars have 
failed to agree on a definition and this also leads to somewhat different conclusions in research 
(Mudde 2014). The purpose of this thesis is not to take part in the big debate but below I will 
present some of the different standpoints and main concepts.  
Mudde (2007:12) means the growing debate about how to define these parties and the so called 
“terminological chaos” is due to a lack of clear definitions. He argues that the radical right parties 
share a core ideology that includes a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. 
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The concept of ”nativism” includes nationalism and xenophobia. Authoritarianism is defined as 
”the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished 
severely”. The last feature, populism Mudde (2004) defines as ” an ideology that considers society 
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale  (general will) of the people”. Rydgren (2007:242) uses a similar definition and states that 
these parties share ”a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism”.  
 
Rydgren (2007) highlights that even though scholars usually agree on which parties to include, the 
lack of consensus regarding the definition and the core ideological characteristics is not very 
satisfying. Kitschelt (2007:1178) states that different scholars apply different concepts and that 
the “radical right has been introduced as an “undefined primitive term”. Some (eg. Mudde 2007) 
use the definition ”radical populist right”, others (eg. Kitschelt 2007, Meguid 2005, de Lange 
2007, Rydgren 2007) settles on ”radical right” while (eg. Van der Brug, et al. 2005, Rooduijn, et al. 
2014, Loxbo 2014, Dahlstrom and Sundell 2012) prefer the definition ”anti-immigrant parties” 
since the parties primarily compete over issues related to immigration and that their political 
agenda also mainly concerns limiting immigration.  
Hereinafter these right-wing parties will be defined as “radical right” due to the simple fact that 
this is the term most used. Moreover, it’s the term used in the dataset that serves as the main 
source in this study. As Mair and Mudde point out (1998) when comparing parties across space 
or time prior classification of the families is required. Thus, a more detailed discussion on 
classification and on which parties to include will be provided in the methods section in which 
the dependent variables is operationalized. 
 
2.2 Political opportunity structures - Convergence of party positions  
When studying what determines variation in electoral success of radical right parties, scholars in 
the field usually distinguish between demand and supply factors. Previous research has showed 
that the supply factors (such as political opportunity structures) do to a higher degree than 
demand-side factors explain why these parties gain support in some countries and not in other 
(Van der Brug, et al. 2005). Party competition, and more specifically, convergence between the 
mainstream left and right on ideological positioning is a political opportunity structure, which has 
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been given great attention by many scholars.  
Herbert Kitschelt, an influential researcher in the field, has in collaboration with Anthony J. 
McGann (1995) produced one of the most prominent studies, The Radical Right in Western Europe: 
a Comparative Analysis, explaining the rise of the radical right in Western Europe. Besides various 
other findings, he develops the theory on how radical right parties benefit when mainstream right 
and left parties converge on economic policy issues. If the distance between these parties is small, 
it creates opportunities for radical right parties to gain influence. Hence, the opportunity 
structure in each country is crucial for the success of radical right parties. One of the main ideas 
presented is the so called “winning formula” of the radical right parties. According to Kitschelt 
the appeal of the radical right has to do with the parties’ combination of neoliberal and 
authoritarian positions. In later work, Kitschelt (2004) himself has modified his standpoint, and 
argues that even though the winning formula was applicable in the 1980’s, since the 1990’s there 
has been a political transformation in Western European party systems and that radical right 
parties have given up their neoliberal economic appeal and taken a more centrist position. Sarah 
de Lange (2007)  study examines Kitschelt’s developed theory by looking at France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands. In her comparative study she analyses the party programmes of the radical right 
and how these are related to the other parties in the party system. Her results are largely 
consistent with the claims of Kitschelt. The study shows that the three parties included, French 
FN, the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the Dutch LPF had all taken an economic position closer to 
the centre but that the authoritarianism still remained present.   
 
Kitschelt (2007) himself highlights the fact that more recent studies have some advantages in 
relation to his own (Kitschelt and McGann 1995) in terms of quality of data, larger number of 
observations across countries and over time. For example, Elisabeth Carter (2005) also focuses 
on the supply side explanations and finds evidence for the argument that ideological convergence 
between mainstream left and right parties is one of the most important factors when explaining 
the success of radical right parties. Carter examines if radical right parties’ failure or success can 
be explained by the parties’ different kinds of radical right ideology and by the different kinds of 
organization and leadership. Furthermore she looks at whether the uneven electoral success can 
be explained by the different patterns of party competition and institutions factors in the party 
systems in which these parties compete. Carter uses expert judgements as her data and in contrast 
to Kitschelt and McGann (1995) tests the convergence hypothesis over time (at four timepoints). 
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Carter’s study is carefully constructed but also limited by the fact that party positioning is 
measured only on a general left-right dimension.  
Similar to Kitschelt and Carter, Van der Brug, et al. (2005) favour the supply side explanations 
rather than the demand side. They argue that, since sociostructural developments (demand 
factors) are so similar within the European Union (EU), those cannot explain the variance in 
electoral support for radical right parties. Their findings also give proof to their standpoint. With 
demand and supply side factors included in their model, it explains 83 % of the variance in 
success of the radical right. However when only including supply side factors the model still 
explains as much as 73 % of the variance.  Van der Brug et al. explore the electoral potential of 
radical right parties by using data on voters’ preferences from the European Election Studies. In 
line with the convergence theory, their findings show that the more centrist stance of the main 
competitor, the stronger the radical right wing parties. 
 
2.3 The sociocultural dimension 
A limitation, which characterises many of the studies testing the convergence hypothesis, is that 
they often fail to include different issue dimensions. This is problematic, since the sociocultural 
dimension has gained importance in relation to the socioeconomic (Oskarson and Demker 
2015:4). Radical right parties have benefitted from the fact that issues concerning identity, 
immigration, multiculturalism, feminism and environment has been politicized.  
Mudde (2007:132-135) states that it’s a big misunderstanding that socioeconomic conditions are 
crucial for the success of the radical right party family.  These are in fact secondary issues that 
receive little attention in party programs and propaganda. Instead, the parties base their economic 
policy agenda on their core ideology of nativism. Radical right parties are very rarely in 
government and can therefore vote-maximize and get away with party programs that contradict 
on economic issues. The class-base of radical right parties isn’t homogenous, rather the 
electorates have opposing economic interests. By treating economics as a secondary issue or even 
present a “schizophrenic” socioeconomic agenda, these parties can attract and make promises to 
all groups without having to choose between neoliberal or welfare chauvinist rhetoric.  
Somewhat in line with previous arguments presented by Mudde, Jan Rovny (2013) looks at 
radical right parties placements and questions the utility of measuring placement of the radical 
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right parties on economic issues. He finds that parties compete on multiple issue dimensions and 
prefer to compete on some issues over others. In order to gain support, radical right parties seek 
to compete on secondary (neglected) issues while blurring their stance on more established issues 
(such as socioeconomic policies). Rovny argues that parties therefore, in order to attract as many 
voters as possible, stress their stance on some issue dimensions, while adapting a strategy of 
“position blurring” on others (2013:2).  
In his case study, Karl Loxbo (2014) applies the concept of political opportunity structures of 
radical right parties by using the example of Sweden and Sweden democrats. He studies how 
voters’ perceptions of policy convergence on economic-redistributive issues and immigration 
policy play out at the individual level and explores whether such convergence improves the 
electoral opportunities of radical right parties. The results in his study show that voters’ 
perceptions of policy convergence on the immigration policy dimension increases the short term 
propensity of viewing SD as an electoral option. Yet, opposite to previous research on the topic, 
Loxbo did not find any proof of convergence on the left-right economic dimension and 
increased short-term propensity of viewing SD as an option. In fact the relationship was actually 
the opposite. Nevertheless Loxbo did find that perceived policy convergence between 
mainstream parties in the field of immigration increases the short-term propensity of viewing SD 
as an electoral option. One can ask if this is true only in Sweden? Loxbo uses a micro-level 
approach and tests short-term individual behaviour. Both hypotheses in his article cover voters’ 
perceptions of the policy alternatives supplied by mainstream parties at given point of time.   
Rydgren (2005:420) highlights the processes of “dealignment” and “realignment” as important 
political opportunity structures. When the socioeconomic cleavage dimension loses salience, the 
sociocultural dimension gains it. According to Rydgren (in Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, et al. 2012) 
the divide between the mainstream left and right on socio-economic issues needs to be clearer in 
order to slow down the success of the radical right. A revitalization of the left-right debate would 
naturally overshadow sociocultural issues such as immigration and could potentially limit the 
influence of the radical right parties. 
In their recently published article, Oskarson and Demker (2015) find that, in the case of Sweden, 
a structure in which room is left for realignment between large parts of the working class and the 
Sweden Democrats has been created, partly as a result of the weakened left-right polarization 
between the main parties. Decreasing left-right polarization (convergence) between the main 
parties is together with a dealignment between the Social democratic party and the working class 
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providing an opportunity for a populist right party (such as the Sweden Democrats) to gain 
support. Their findings show that radical right parties mobilize along the sociocultural dimension 
rather than the economic left-right dimension and that most radical right parties mobilize support 
based on their anti-immigrant views. A decreased left-right polarization (convergence) in the 
traditional Swedish party system, at the same time as most parties have moved towards a 
libertarian position on cultural issues such as immigration, has formed a ‘window of opportunity’ 
and made it possible for the Sweden Democrats to take the authoritarian ideological position and 
mobilize parts of the Swedish working class (Oskarson and Demker 2015). 
 
2.4 Research gaps 
When going deeper in to the huge research field of the radical right party phenomena you find that 
the empirical findings regarding what determines their success are quite inconsistent. Moreover, 
studies have shown different results when testing the convergence hypothesis. A general problem 
seems to be that scholars have focused mostly on specific countries in which these parties have 
been successful without comparing these cases with countries in which they failed to emerge 
(which is the case in several European countries). As Rydgren (2007:247) points out, the focus on 
national cases and  lack of comparative perspective has resulted “ad-hoc theorizing”. It’s 
problematic to ignore research done on similar parties in other countries and instead trying to find 
causes within each country (Rydgren 2005). There seems to be a majority of qualitative within 
country case studies in the field. There is a shortage of comparative studies and many of those that 
exist are limited by the fact that they only compare a few country case studies.  
A majority of previous cross-country studies have either looked so called demand side factors such 
as socioeconomic conditions or at the individual level and voters perceptions of policy positions 
rather than studied convergence and policy positions at the party level. As Rydgren (2012:235) 
states when discussing the shortcomings of Kitschelt (1995)’s famous study (which uses voters' 
perceptions of party positions) - even though a voter might prefer a liberal standpoint on 
economic issues, it does not necessary mean that the party drives such an agenda. It’s also 
problematic to derive voters’ perceptions of party positioning and use these in broad cross-national 
comparisons since national public opinion surveys uses different questions and wordings.  
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Even if the radical right is covered extensively among scholars there is clearly a need to study the 
uneven success of the radical right in Western Europe further.  What previous research lacks is a 
comparative cross-country analysis focusing on mainstream party positioning by using some more 
recently published data including not only the left-right economic positioning but also the 
sociocultural dimension. 
 
3. Aim and research question 
The aim of this study is to look at major mainstream party policy positioning and test the theory 
stating that convergence of the mainstream left and right parties on policy positions might open 
up for influence of far right parties (Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt 2007). A two-dimensional approach 
will be applied and party positioning will be studied both on the left-right economic and on the 
left-right sociocultural dimension.  
Following research question is identified: 
 How may party positioning of the mainstream left and right parties affect the success of radical 
 right parties in Western Europe? 
 
4. Theoretical model 
In the previous research section I was introducing research related to the theories that are of 
prime interest for this thesis. The theoretical approach that will be used is built on the theory of 
classic party competition (Downs 1957) taking place in a two-dimensional space including not 
only the socioeconomic but also the sociocultural dimension (Kitschelt 1994) and taking into 
account the importance of policy positioning by the mainstream parties (Meguid 2005). In the 
following subsections I will first present the key theoretical concepts, second I will discuss 
potential delimitations to the theoretical framework and my interpretation of it. Finally I will 
present the five hypotheses that will be used to test the theory.  
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4.1 Left-right convergence as a political opportunity structure 
The first part of the theory relates to the spatial argument originally developed by Anthony 
Downs (1957) stating that when mainstream parties’ policy positions become more similar, voters 
will look for alternatives which better represent their preferences. Political competition occurs in 
a dimensional structure in which rational parties choose policy positions to minimize the distance 
between themselves and the voters. Meguid (2005:348) explains it the following way “parties 
competing for votes are faced with two possible strategies: movement toward (policy 
convergence) or movement away from (policy divergence) a specific competitor in a given policy 
space”. In order to attract voters from competitors, parties are employing a strategy of policy 
convergence while diverging on policy issues on the other hand incites voter flight to the 
competitor. However Downs only refer to the general left-right dimension when discussing party 
positions. Kitschelt (1994; 1995) and later also Meguid (2005) extends the spatial theory further. I 
will discuss this more in detail below.   
The key theoretical explanation to be used in this thesis derives from the core theoretical 
argument devolved by Kitschelt in his work The Transformation of European Social Democracy (1994) 
and then later extended inThe Radical Right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis (1995) . Due to 
a change in competitive space in West European democracies, Kitschelt develops a new more 
complex pattern, with a shift from a one-dimensional axis (traditionally including the socialist vs. 
capitalist dimension) to a two-dimensional competitive space also including libertarian vs. 
authoritarian politics. Within this two-dimensional space, Kitschelt locate both voters and 
political parties. A change of voter distribution may create vacuums in the competitive space that 
creates an electoral opportunity structure and open up for a radical party to gain electoral success 
(De Lange 2007: 412-415). Kitschelt states that the support for radical right parties ”depends on 
the strategic interaction of competing parties in the party system” (1995:14).  
As already mentioned in the previous research section, whether or not the radical right parties 
then manage to succeed, according to Kitschelt, depends on if they provide a ”winning formula”. 
Kitschelt argues that the success of these parties depends on their strategic appeal and only if 
they choose an economic liberal standpoint combined with ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, 
they would attract a broad spectrum of voters. As already mentioned the “winning formula” has 
been criticized (and later moderated by Kitschelt himself 2004). Therefore I have chosen to 
neglect the theoretical reasoning around the winning formula in this thesis and only make use of 
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Kitschelt’s theoretical core about left-right convergence on different issue dimensions and how it 
may create a political opportunity structure.  
“The conditions for the rise of the extreme-rightist parties become favourable if moderately left and 
right parties converge toward the median vote. Under these conditions, the established parties fail to 
attend to a wide uncovered field of more radical right authoritarian voters who will search for an 
for a new political alternative” (1995: vii). 
The theory states that the degree of convergence in the political space facilitates for radical right 
parties to emerge. It may create a feeling that no real difference exists between the mainstream 
parties. A convergence on the economic dimension may also lead to a de-politicization of this 
dimension and facilitating for radical right parties to mobilize on other issue dimensions such as 
the sociocultural (Rydgren 2005:423).  
As previously mentioned, Meguid (2005:348-349) has extended the spatial theory by focusing on 
mainstream party strategies and the behaviour of the competitors to the radical right (by her 
referred to as niche parties). According to her theoretical claim, mainstream parties play a role in 
shaping the success of radical right parties by adding salience and issue ownership as important 
components that affect the support. Meguid argues that parties do not compete on all issues in 
the political space in each election. Rather, a party can shape the importance of different issue 
dimensions when deciding on which issues it wants to compete on in a specific election. 
According to Meguid the combination of strategies used by the mainstream parties is what 
matters. They can choose an accommodative (adopt the positions of the new competitor) or an 
adversarial strategy. When a mainstream party uses a so called adversarial strategy it encourages 
niche party electoral support as it forces the other mainstream party (that is maybe closer to the 
new party and probably competing for the same voters) to take a position on the “new” issue. 
The argument is quite complex but Kitschelt describes it in a simple way:  
 
 “- a new party taking a radical position on a hitherto dormant issue dimension will 
 do well when a mainstream party that is far distant from that position politicises the new 
 dimension by adopting the opposite position on the issue” (2007:1187). 
 
The issue dimension will then be included within the mainstream political debate and this helps 
the niche party to gain votes from the other mainstream party. According to her theoretical 
argument this can even have extreme effects and in the long run completely eliminate the 
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mainstream party opponent and replace it with a niche party (Kitschelt 2007; Meguid 2005:348-
349). Bale et al. (2010) have in a case study covering five countries, looked closely at mainstream 
left parties and found that these often uses a mix of strategies on order to respond to the radical 
right. The social democratic response is influenced not only by the radical right but also by the by 
the reactions of mainstream centre-right parties. 
 
To sum up, in accordance to the theoretical arguments presented, I expect that when 
convergence is taking place between the major mainstream parties due to their ambition to attract 
the median voter in either one or both dimensions this creates a void and an opportunity 
structure and thus facilitates for the radical right parties to emerge and attract voters in search for 
a new political alternative. However taking the modification of the spatial argument made by 
Meguid into account, I will also explore if there is any correlation between the major mainstream 
parties’ position on the “new issue” dimension, namely the sociocultural and the electoral success 
of the radical right. In line with Meguid’s theoretical claim, I expect that a more right wing party 
of the major mainstream right might legitimize issues around which the extreme right mobilizes 
and that this in turn facilitates its electoral success.  
 
4.2 Delimitations of the theory 
The theory focuses on the mainstream parties and how their policy positioning on an economic 
and/or a sociocultural dimension may create favourable conditions, which facilitate success for 
the radical right parties. However as already pointed out there is not one universal cause for the 
rise of the radical right and the theoretical elements included in this thesis do not capture all 
potential reasons behind why radical right parties succeed in some countries while they fail in 
others. There are many other potential reasons behind why voters find it appealing to vote for 
the radical right such as for example the political strategies used by the radical right party in order 
to attract voters.  
Previous research has also given attention to structural demand side factors such as economic 
conditions, levels of unemployment and level of immigration. Even though many studies have 
shown that the explanation of the success of these parties is rather to find on the supply side of 
the equation I will include some of these factors by controlling for aggregate levels of annual 
increase/decrease in GDP per capita, number of asylum applicants and unemployment level in 
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each country. However, when looking at convergence between mainstream parties I do ignore 
micro level factors in general and therefore do not look individual characteristics related to voting 
for the radical right such as education, gender and socioeconomic conditions.  
Another potential limitation of how I have chosen to interpret the theory is the choice not to 
include institutional factors such as electoral systems. For example Arzheimer and Carter (2006) 
in their study found that electoral systems have an effect on the electoral opportunity structure of 
political parties. The reason behind why such factors are excluded is simply due to time 
constraints and that the variation in these do not seem to be that big in Western Europe. 
In sum, there are many possible alternative explanations to the rise of radical right but taking all 
of these into account in a cross-country analysis would constitute a huge task and outside the 
scope of a study this size. 
4.3 Hypotheses derived from the theory 
In order to test the theory of convergence of mainstream parties’ positioning on the left - right 
economic dimension and the sociocultural dimension following hypotheses are derived: 
 Hypothesis 1: The closer the mainstream left and right parties are positioned on the economic left-
 right dimension, the greater likelihood of there being a radical right party in a country. 
 Hypothesis 2: The closer the mainstream left and right parties are positioned on the sociocultural 
 dimension, the greater likelihood of there being a radical right party in a country. 
 Hypothesis 3: The closer the mainstream left and right parties are positioned on the economic left-
 right dimension, the greater electoral success for the radical right party. 
 Hypothesis 4: The closer the mainstream left and right parties are positioned on the sociocultural 
 dimension, the greater electoral success for the radical right party. 
The first four hypotheses are testing the theoretical arguments about spatial theory and policy 
convergence taking place on different issue dimensions (presented by Downs and later extended 
by Kitschelt). However since the spatial theory has also been modified by Meguid, a fifth 
hypothesis testing her theoretical argument has been included and focuses on the positioning of 
the major mainstream right party on the “new issue” dimension, namely the sociocultural. 
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 Hypothesis 5: The more to the right the major mainstream right party is positioned on the sociocultural 
 dimension, the greater electoral success for the radical right party. 
 
5. Method and operationalization  
This section will present the dataset and introduce the statistical methods used in this study. The 
units of analysis are 15 different party systems in 14 countries. Belgium will be treated as two 
separate systems, due to the fact that Flanders and Wallonia has two separate party systems. First 
I will discuss potential delimitations of the methods used. Then I will introduce the data sources 
used to construct the dataset. Thereafter I will explain how I measure the two dependent 
variables and discuss the operationalization of the independent and the control variables. Finally I 
will discuss the statistical methods used to test the hypotheses of my theoretical model. 
5.1 Delimitations  
When trying to explain variation in success of the radical right in Western Europe and whether 
convergence of policy positions held by mainstream left and right parties have an impact a 
quantitative method is more suitable than a qualitative. Carefully constructed case studies can 
take more factors into account and may therefore be better at explaining the success of a radical 
right party within a specific country. However, in order to be able to draw conclusions across 
countries and over time a cross-country time variant study at the macro level seems like the most 
suitable type of statistical method.  
As previously mentioned when presenting the theory, to keep this analysis within a reasonable 
size while at the same time covering the central parts of the theoretical concepts, a number of 
delimitations has been made. As regards to the method, the thesis is limited by the fact that it 
does not include any data from the 1980’s and the early 1990’s. The reason behind is a simple 
one, the main data source used, namely the CHES expert survey, covers only timepoints from 
1999 and onwards. Since the radical right started to emerge earlier there could have been reason 
to combine the source with other expert surveys, however it would make the model more 
complex as regards to operationalization of main concepts and so on. The thesis is also limited by 
the fact that I’m only looking at countries in Western Europe. For example, Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia also have radical right parties (Mudde 2016, October 22). Previous research has left out 
Eastern Europe in order to keep structural conditions constant (since they are so similar in 
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Western Europe) and stated out by Mudde, Eastern European countries do not really fit in the 
main theory since post communist politics has been experiencing polarization rather than 
convergence (Mudde 2007:239).  
5.2 Data sources 
The dataset used is covering party positions in 15 countries/party systems in the EU member 
states of Western Europe. It’s constructed by the use of country-level data from Chapel Hill 
expert surveys (CHES) from five different timepoints (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014) (Bakker, 
et al. 2015). A total of 15 countries included at five different timepoints, makes 75 observations 
in the dataset. Further down in this section, the following subsections on how to operationalize 
the theoretical concepts will present and discuss the various variables in the dataset more in 
detail.  
 
The Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES) rely on placements by academic experts. As pointed out 
by Bakker et al. (2015) expert surveys do have some advantages do have some advantage when 
measuring party positions. Regardless of the size of a party, its parliamentary status, whether it 
has manifesto or not and independent from the electoral cycle an expert survey allow researchers 
to obtain a large number of party positions.  
 
However, as Mudde (2007) points out, even though expert studies provide a reliable source of 
data for studies of the supply side, such datasets can also be questioned. For example not every 
political scientist in country X is an expert on radical right politics in that country. This is also 
something pointed out by Hooghe et al. (2010: 6), who states that it might be challenging for 
experts to have a task which includes interpreting and analysing signals from various sources of 
information such as speeches, party manifestos and information reported in newspapers, 
television and on the Internet. However as also highlighted by Hooghe et al., when looking at the 
respondents one can identify professional researchers who have been published in either the field 
of political parties and/or European integration in a specific country. Budge (2000) has 
questioned expert surveys in terms of validity, he argues that expert surveys produce only a 
“snapshot” of where parties are located at a specific timepoint but that the definition behind is 
not clear. Budge is asking questions such as: Are the positions reported the one of the leaders of 
the party or the electorates? In regards to time, are the judgments done by the experts 
representing the present moment or the past? If the conceptions of what parties are differ this 
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might result in experts using different criteria when positioning parties (2000:111).  
 
As pointed out by Steenbergen and Marks (2007:348-349) it all comes down to the fundamental 
question of how the experts interpret the questions in the survey. There are ways of evaluating 
how well questions in surveys are constructed and if it is the case that experts are basing their 
judgments differently. The key is to look at the standard deviations among expert placements. 
Bakker, et al.  (2015) look at the 2010 survey and the reliability of the CHES experts’ placements 
by doing so and find that these are quite small. Experts tend to agree on the placement of parties. 
They also cross-validate the 2010 survey with other sources (European Election Study 2009 and 
the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset) and find a considerable common structure across the 
different measures. In line with such findings, when studying the reliability of the CHES expert 
judgments and comparing their validity with the Comparative Manifesto data and the Benoit-
Laver and Rohrschneider-Whitefield expert surveys, Hooghe et al. (2010:13) also find that “the 
CHES data are a reasonably valid and reliable source of information on party positioning on 
European integration and ideological positioning”.  
 
An important fact pointed out by Van de Brug and Van Spanje (2009:316) is that expert surveys 
might miss some relevant issue dimensions. However since my aim is to do a cross-country 
analysis over time using already predefined scales, I do not consider this as big problem for me. 
Rather, I find expert surveys the most useful in order to understand something as complex as 
party positions. 
 
5.3 Measuring the dependent variable: Radical right party 
The first dependent variable that is to be explained in the analysis captures whether a country has 
a radical right party or not. The original variable, found in the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill trendfile, 
there classifying party family association, is computed into a binary variable in which no presence 
of a radical right party was coded as 0 and presence of radical right party was coded as 1. The 
likelihood of there being a radical right party is what is of interest in the analysis. Countries in 
which the support for radical right parties is extremely low (below 1 %) will be excluded from the 
analyses. In the second model the other dependent variable, electoral success of the radical right 
is operationalized as the percentage of votes received by the radical right party in the election 
most prior to the year of evaluation. 
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As previously mentioned in the theory section, the classification of radical right parties in this 
study is made by Chapel Hill’s family classification which is based on Hix and Lord (1997). The 
parties included are Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria; Vlaams Blok/Belang (VB) and 
Front National (FN) in Belgium; Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark; True Finns (PS) in Finland; 
Front National (FN) in France; Die Republikaner (REP) and Nationaldemoktratische Partie Deutschlands 
(NPD) in Germany; Golden Dawn (XA), Laikós Orthódoxos Synergarmós (LAOS) and Anexartitoi 
Ellines (ANEL) in Greece, Alleanza Nazionale (AN) in Italy; Patij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in 
Netherlands; Ny demokrati (NyD) and Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in Sweden and United Kingdom 
Inpendence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. In countries/party systems where there were 
more than one radical right party at a specific timepoint, I made the decision only to include the 
one with highest vote share in the analysis. 
The Northern Italian separatist Lega Nord (LN) is a special case since it’s often recognised as both 
regionalist and radical right. However it’s categorized as a regionalist party in the CHES data and 
therefore not included as a radical right party in the analysis. Nevertheless, Mair and Mudde 
(1998) argue that if one applies the ideological criterion, the party is to be considered belonging in 
the radical right family. Several scholars have also made such decision and considers LN as 
radical right party in their studies (eg. Rovny 2013; Van der Brug, et al. 2005; Ennser 2012; 
Lubbers, et al. 2002; Rydgren 2007).  
The newly formed Alternative fu ̈r Deutschland (Afd) in Germany is in the CHES dataset classified as 
not belonging to any family at all and hence not included in the study as radical right party. 
According to Arzheimer (2015) the party is located at the right spectrum but does not qualify as 
radical (even if that’s how its usually described by its competitors). It’s a young party that is hard 
to classify and there is clearly a grey zone since the party’s core issues are Euroscepticism and 
nationalism. However as Arzheimer points out, AfD belongs in the ECR political group in the 
European Parliament and is probably closer to the British conservatives than the FN in France or 
the FPÖ in Austria.  
See Table A3 in Appendix for complete list of included radical right parties/year. 
5.4 Mainstream left and right parties  
When defining the major mainstream left and right parties I will use the definitions provided by 
Rovny (2013). Included in the analyses will be the most significant mainstream political party on 
  18 
either side of the left-right spectrum in each political system. Often meaning the primary 
governing party and the main opposition party. Opposite to Rovny, in order to simplify the 
construction of the variables I made a decision only to include one (in most cases the largest) 
major mainstream left and right party in each country/party system.  
When constructing my independent variables I was faced with making the choice of which major 
mainstream left and right parties to include from each country/party system. Since the party 
systems are highly diversified the case selection turned out to be quite complicated. Hence I am 
aware that this may constitute a weakness in the analysis. Particularly difficult was the case 
selection of Flanders in Belgium where the largest right party is the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
(NVA). However this party is in the CHES data coded as regionalist and therefore I made the 
decision not to include it as the major mainstream right and instead include the Christen-
Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V) party. Moreover, it was also complicated to choose the major 
mainstream left party in Italy. I decided to include the no longer existing socialist party Partito 
Democratico della Sinistra (PDS, DS) for the 1999, 2002 and 2006 and then the Partito Democratico 
(PD) (founded in 2007) the years 2010 and 2014. In addition, Netherlands was a particularly 
tricky case. Here I decided to include Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA) instead of the liberal 
VVD as the major mainstream right party. In the case of Finland I decided to include Kansallinen 
Kokoomus (KOK) (in the data coded conservative/liberal) as the major mainstream right party 
over the Suomen Keskusta (KESK) since it’s coded as agrarian/centre in the CHES data.  
See table A2 in the appendix for a complete list of included major mainstream left and right 
parties.  
5.5 How to measure convergence of mainstream party positions  
The two main independent variables measure the absolute distance on positioning between the 
major mainstream right and major mainstream left party in each country. One variable measures 
the distance on the positioning of parties in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. 
The other computed variable measures the distance between the two parties in each country on 
positioning on the sociocultural (GAL-TAN) dimension. It is important to highlight that, in 
order to measure convergence or polarization, the computed variables used in the analyses only 
measure the distance on positioning and not positioning itself. Minimum distance between the 
parties on positioning is 0 and maximum is 10 on both dimensions. Low score indicates a high 
degree of convergence and high score denote a low degree of convergence between the two 
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mainstream parties (divergence).  
5.5.1 The economic left-right dimension 
When operationalizing the distance of party positioning on the economic left right dimension I 
use the original variable from the CHES dataset. The wording in the questions in the 
questionnaire provided to the experts has been more or less the same in throughout the whole 
period 1999-2014 (see table A4 in the appendix). The original 11-point scale ranges from 0 
(extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Parties positioned on the left want the government to play an 
active role in the economy (favors a stronger welfare state with higher taxes) while parties 
positioned on the right want the government to play a less active role in the economy (for 
example wants privatization, deregulation, lower taxes, less government spending (Bakker, et al. 
2015; Hooghe, et al. 2010). Based on the variable in the CHES data I have created two new 
independent variables measuring the major mainstream right and left parties’ positioning on the 
economic dimension (MRecon, MLecon) and another independent variable (Distecon) that covers the 
absolute distance of the two major mainstream parties’ positioning on the economic policy 
dimension. 
5.5.2 The GAL-TAN dimension 
As previously mentioned, in order to operationalize the mainstream party positioning distance on 
the sociocultural dimension I will use the variable in CHES data covering party positioning on a 
“green/alternative/libertarian” (GAL) to a “traditional/authoritarian/nationalist” (TAN) 
dimension. As was the case on the economic left right, the wording has been essentially the same 
throughout the whole period 1999-2014 (see table A4 in the appendix). Depending on their views 
on democratic freedoms and rights, parties are classified on a scale that ranges from 0 
(libertarian/postmaterialist) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian). The parties that are classified as left 
and libertarian value personal freedoms such as for example access to abortion, immigration and 
same-sex marriage. On the contrary, at the right side of the spectrum the more traditional parties 
often reject the very same ideas (Bakker, et al. 2015; Hooghe, et al. 2010). With help of the GAL-
TAN variable in the CHES data I have created two independent variables in my dataset 
measuring the major mainstream left and right parties’ positioning on this dimension (MRgaltan, 
MLgaltan) and another independent variable (Distgaltan) that covers the absolute distance of the 
major mainstream parties’ positioning on the GAL-TAN dimension.   
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5.6 Operationalization of control variables  
It is important to control for other factors that might influence the presence and success of 
radical right parties. Therefore, when testing the effect of mainstream party positioning and 
convergence, some control variables on an aggregate level are included in the analysis. As noted 
by Mudde (2016, October 22) globalization and the economic crises in Europe together with 
increased immigration are usually seen as explanations behind increased populism and the 
emergence of the radical right. I will therefore control for some factors usually looked at when 
measuring these conditions.   
As one control variable aggregated unemployment data has been included, the variable measures 
yearly percentage of unemployed people in the work force. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) in their 
model finds that unemployment (as a macro variable) has a very big impact and that higher 
unemployment reduced the probability of a vote for a radical right party. This negative 
relationship indicates that these parties perform better in countries where unemployment is low. 
The same results were found by Lubbers, et al. (2002). However in the same study, an opposite 
relationship was found when tested on an individual level. On a micro level, they found that 
persons who were unemployed were more likely to vote for a radical right party.  
Second I will control for inflows of refugees. Previous studies (eg. Lubbers, et al. 2002) have 
showed that the number of asylum applicants has a positive effect on support for radical right 
parties while others (eg. Van der Brug, et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006) found no 
significant relationship, and concluded that this did not affect support for the radical right.  
Finally, I will control for economic growth by including data measuring (% annual change in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from previous year). Previous research (eg. Van der 
Brug, et al. 2005) has found that where economic growth is smaller in relation to other Western 
European countries, support to the radical right party tends to be stronger.  
The data measuring the number of asylum applicants, the total level of unemployment (%) and 
annual GDP growth per capita in each country at every timepoint are all taken from Eurostat (see 
more detailed information on the obtained variables in table A1 in the Appendix).   
5.7 Statistical method 
This thesis uses a quantitative methodological approach. Since I want to explain variation in two 
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different dependent variables I have decided to employ a two-step method. First, I will use a 
logistic regression in order to test the first set of hypotheses (1 and 2). Second, an OLS regression 
will be used when testing the second set of hypotheses (3 and 4) and hypothesis 5. The data is 
from five different timepoints, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. In the logistic regressions, since 
the data is time-series-cross-section with a binary dependent variable, so called BTSCS-data 
insights from Beck et al (1998) and Beck (2001) has been useful and methodological decisions 
has been made according to their suggestions. As suggested, the data is recognized as grouped 
duration data and therefore issues ignoring temporal interdependence of the date are taken into 
account. 
  
The logistic regression model tests the proposition that the likelihood of there existing a radical 
right party or not in a country varies according to the distance between the mainstream left and 
right parties positioning on a socioeconomic dimension and the distance between the mainstream 
left and right parties on a sociocultural dimension. Hence, the model allows me to estimate the 
probability of there being a radical right party conditional on the distance on positioning of major 
mainstream parties on the economic policy and the sociocultural policy dimension (GALTAN). 
The statistical analysis builds on a dataset constructed with data from the CHES survey (Bakker, 
et al. 2015) and Eurostat. It is grouped in countries and year and the command tsset was used in 
order to tell the statistical program that I was dealing with time-series data. For each country-case 
the binary dependent variable expresses whether there exists a radical right party (1) or not (0) the 
different timepoints of evaluation. The logistic regression analysis will be run on 75 observations 
grouped by 15 countries and 5 timepoints.   
As a second dependent variable I will include the percentage of votes received by the radical right 
party (in the national election most prior to the timepoint of evaluation) and as a second step test 
hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Since vote share is 
measured as a continuous scale I believe that an OLS is the most suitable type of method. The 
OLS-regression analysis will be run on 45 observations since only parties having a radical right 
party will be included. As was the case in the logistic regression, the data is grouped by countries 
and timepoint of evaluation.  
 
As previously mentioned, two of the independent variables are used to operationalize 
convergence between mainstream left and right parties. They are newly computed from the 
original variables in the CHES datasets. Four hypotheses will be tested by logistic and OLS-
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regression models including following main independent variables:  
 
• Distance on party positioning of the major mainstream left and right party at the 
economic dimension (Distecon) 
• Distance on party positioning of the major mainstream left and right party at the 
sociocultural dimension (Distgaltan) 
The fifth hypothesis is somewhat competing with the other four and will be tested using OLS-
regressions model including variables measuring positioning of the major mainstream left and the 
major mainstream right party on each dimension (MRecon, MLecon, MRgaltan, MLgaltan).  
Furthermore, as previously argued, following control variables will be taken into consideration: 
• Level of total unemployment in % in each country the specific timepoint of evaluation 
(Unemployment) 
• The natural logarithm of number of asylum applicants in each country the specific 
timepoint of evaluation in the (Ln asylum). Using the natural logarithm enables a normal 
distribution of the coefficient and avoids errors affecting the results. 
• Annual change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (in %) in each country the 
specific timepoint of evaluation (GDPgrowth) 
As for the control variables, unemployment and number of asylum applicants is expected to have 
a positive relationship with the dependent variables while GDP growth is expected to have a 
negative relationship. Moreover as suggested by Beck, et al. (1998) and Beck (2001) a series of 
time dummy variables will be incorporated, hence allowing for temporal dependence. As a 
robustness check I will control for country effects by clustering the standard errors on the 
country level.  
 
6. Results  
Before testing the hypotheses, I first present characteristics of the dependent variables and the 
key independent variables; major mainstream party policy positioning and convergence of 
mainstream parties’ positions on the economic and the GAL-TAN dimension. 
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Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics on the main independent variables 
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
MRecon  
(0-10) 
75 6.889 .873 5.25 8.63 
MLecon  
(0-10) 
75 3.668 .740 2.13 5.63 
Distecon (0-
10) 
75 3.219 1.061 0.46 5.019 
MRgaltan 
(0-10) 
75 6.426 1.118 3 8.46 
MLgaltan 
(0-10) 
75 3.647 .787 2.15 5.5 
Distgaltan 
(0-10) 
75 2.780 1.503 0.19 6.13 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.) 
Table 6.1. Radical right parties in 10 Western European countries 2014 
Country Radical right 
party 
Election results 
in the latest 
election 
(percentage) 
Election year 
Austria FPO 
BZO 
20.5 
3.5 
2013 
2013 
Belgium: 
Flemish region  
 
VB 
 
3.7 
 
2014 
Denmark DF 12.2 2011 
Finland PS 19.1 2011 
France FN 13.6 2012 
Germany NPD 1.3 2013 
Greece XA 
ANEL 
LAOS 
6.9 
7.5 
1.6 
2012 
2012 
2012 
Netherlands PVV 10.1 2012 
Sweden SD 12.9 2014 
United Kingdom UKIP 3.1 2010 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.) 
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Table 6.1. above shows the countries/party systems which had a radical right party at the most 
recent timepoint of evaluation (2014). In 2014, 10 out of the 15 countries/party systems included 
in the analysis had at least one radical right party with a vote share over 1 %. The vote shares (%) 
received by radical right parties were especially high in countries such as Austria, Finland, France, 
Sweden and Denmark. Looking at descriptive statistics on the main independent variables in 
table 6.2, the data shows that the variance of party positioning is higher among the major 
mainstream right parties than among the major mainstream left parties on both the economic and 
sociocultural dimension. In general, variance is higher on the sociocultural dimension, which 
means that policy positions are more spread out on this dimension. 
 
6.1 Regression results  
In the theory section I presented five hypotheses that predict how my main independent 
variables affect the two dependent variables, (Radical_right_party and Vote_share). The first two 
hypotheses specify how the independent variables measuring distance between the major 
mainstream parties on each dimension, are expected to theoretically explain the likelihood for a 
country to have a radical right party. I first hypothesized that whether or not a country/party 
system has a radical right party would be affected by the distance of the policy positions of the 
major mainstream parties on the economic dimension. I expected a negative relationship, the 
larger distance on policy positioning between the mainstream parties, the smaller likelihood of 
radical right party.  
 
Second, I hypothesized that the likelihood of a country/party system having a radical right party 
would be affected by the distance of the policy positions of the major mainstream parties on the 
sociocultural dimension (GAL-TAN). As stated in theory section, I expected to find a negative 
relationship, the smaller the distance between the parties, the greater likelihood of having a 
radical right party. To test the hypotheses logistic regression models allow me to estimate the 
probability of having a radical right party conditional on the closeness of positioning of 
mainstream parties on the economic and sociocultural dimension. Controlling for level of 
unemployment, number of asylum seekers and GDP growth.  
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Table 6.3. Logistic regressions with robust standard errors: The effect of several independent variables on 
the likelihood of having a radical right party 
DV – Radical 
right party (0-1) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate 
regressions) 
Model 2 
(Multivariate 
regressions 
without 
controls) 
Model 3 
(Multivariate 
regressions 
with controls) 
Model 4 
(Multivariate 
regressions with 
controls and 
dummies) 
Distecon (0-10) .312 
(.244) 
.276 
(.259) 
.224 
(.273) 
.112 
(.352) 
 
Distgaltan (0-10) -.137 
(.218) 
-.0828 
(.250) 
-.108 
(.252) 
-.204 
(.286) 
 
Control variables 
    
Unemployment 
(%) 
  -.059 
(.073) 
-.065 
(.092) 
GDP growth 
/capita 
  -.370 
(.109)*** 
-.645 
(.184)*** 
Ln (Number of 
asylum 
applicants) 
  .517 
(.252)** 
.626 
(.274)** 
 
Constant 
   
-3.3596 
 
-3.658 
 
Year dummy 
variables 
   Included 
Cox and Snell R2 
 
 
 0.030 0.216 0.290 
N 75 75 75 75 
Notes: Coefficients are in log-odds units. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country within parentheses 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.); Eurostat  
 
 
Table 6.3 presents the results of the logistic regressions analysis. For the interpretation of the 
models, a positive parameter which is significant at the a p < 0.05 level indicates that the 
likelihood of having an extreme right party has increased, while a negative parameter denotes a 
decreased likelihood. Model 1 includes bivariate regressions, Model 2 includes multivariate 
regressions without controls and Model 4 multivariate regressions including both control 
variables and the time dummy variables. By looking at the results in the Table 6.3 I can 
immediately conclude that hypotheses 1 and 2 not are supported and that these can be rejected. 
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Since the findings do not reach the level of significance, and the true effect can be regarded as 
zero, I decided not to interpret the coefficients any further. Hence there was no reason for 
transforming odds into probabilities and calculate the predicted probabilities for the independent 
variables.   
 
With regard to the control variables included, the analysis arrives at the following findings. As 
expected, an increase in the annual percentage of GDP/capita is associated with a decreased 
likelihood of having a radical right party. As also expected, an increased amount of asylum 
applicants in a country is associated with an increased likelihood of having radical right party.  
 
Table 6.4. OLS-regressions with robust standard errors: The effect of independent variables measuring 
distance on policy positioning on the electoral success of radical right parties 
DV – Vote share 
(%) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate 
regressions) 
Model 2 
(Multivariate 
regressions 
without 
controls) 
Model 3 
(Multivariate 
regressions 
with controls) 
Model 4 
(Multivariate 
regressions with 
controls and 
dummies) 
Distecon (0-10) .444 
(.882) 
1.095 
(.871) 
.798 
(1.105) 
.731 
(.998) 
Distgaltan (0-10) 1.238 
(.764) 
1.483 
(.795) 
1.760 
(.671)* 
2.643 
(.757)** 
 
Control variables 
    
Unemployment 
(%) 
  -.195 
(.209) 
-.328 
(.285) 
GDP growth 
/capita 
  -.559 
(.461) 
.061 
(.451) 
Ln (number of 
asylum 
applicants) 
  -1.730 
(1.020) 
-3.543 
(1.23)* 
Constant   21.432 
(12.661) 
32.258 
(14.58)* 
Year dummy 
variables 
   Included 
R-square 
 
 
 0.111 0.224 0.404 
N 45 45 45 45 
 
Notes: *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country within parentheses 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.); Eurostat  
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It is important to point out that my non-findings do not prove that previous research has been 
wrong or that the convergence thesis is not valid, more likely they are results of problems 
associated with limitations of the measurements and the models used in this study. For example 
there is most likely a small N-problem - the number of repeated observations per unit is a too 
small. Moreover, another shortcoming of the logistic regressions above is that there is not 
enough variation in the dependent variable used. 
 
The third and fourth hypotheses will be tested by using OLS-regressions. These specify how the 
independent variables are expected to explain the electoral success of the radical right party (% of 
votes received in the election most prior to the timepoint of evaluation). In both hypotheses I 
hypothesised negative relationships, expecting that when the distance between the parties’ policy 
positions decrease, this will have a positive effect on vote share.  
Table 6.4 illustrates the results of the OLS-regression analysis. Model 1 includes bivariate 
regressions, Model 2 includes multivariate regressions without controls and Model 4 multivariate 
regressions including both control variables and time dummy variables. Since only 
countries/political systems with a radical right party are included the numbers of cases have 
decreased from 75 to 45. As illustrated in the table, the effects of Distecon are insignificant in all 
models.  
I therefore conclude that in my analysis, distance on positioning between the major mainstream 
right and major mainstream on the economic policy dimension has no effect on the electoral 
success of the radical right and that hypothesis 3 can be rejected. 
However, when testing hypothesis 4, Model 3 and 4 supports that distance of major mainstream 
parties positioning on the sociocultural dimension (Distgaltan) has an effect on the electoral 
success of the radical right (Vote_share). As hypothesised in the theory section, it can be 
concluded that there is a relationship between the two variables. Yet opposite what I expected, 
the findings show that when distance on party positions increases on the sociocultural dimension, 
this has a positive effect on electoral success of the radical right. Thus, hypothesis 4 can also be 
rejected since the direction of the relationship was opposite to what was expected.   
Looking at Distgaltan, the coefficient in model 4 tells us that there is a positive relationship, when 
the distance increases by one step on the scale (0-10), the vote share of the radical right party will 
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increase by 2.643 percent on average. The findings here go against a majority of the literature and 
what was expected when formulating the hypothesis. Rather it makes a case for divergence 
between the major mainstream parties on the sociocultural dimension being associated with 
electoral success of the radical right party. 
Since the results do not hold, or as in the case of Distgaltan show an opposite relationship, I fail to 
establish the relationships expected in the first four hypotheses.  
 
Table 6.5. OLS-regressions with robust standard errors: The effect of independent variables 
measuring policy positioning of mainstream parties on the electoral success of radical right parties 
DV – Vote 
share (%) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate 
regressions) 
Model 2 
(Multivariate 
regressions 
without 
controls) 
Model 3 
(Multivariate 
regressions 
with controls) 
Model 4 
(Multivariate 
regressions with 
controls and 
dummies) 
MRecon (0-10) 0.305 
(1.142) 
1.397 
(1.530) 
.815 
(1.535) 
.449 
(1.753) 
MLecon (0-10) -.495 
(1.670) 
-1.531 
(1.343) 
 
-1.881 
(1.789) 
-1.808 
(1.577) 
MRgaltan(0-10) 2.056 
(.909)* 
2.634 
(.868)* 
2.860 
(0.834)** 
3.272 
(.743)*** 
MLgaltan (0-10) -.361 
(1.484) 
.366 
(1.642) 
.611 
(1.260) 
-.778 
(1.482) 
Control variables     
Unemployment 
(%) 
  -.107 
(.199) 
-.241 
(.29) 
GDP growth 
/capita 
  -.810 
(.437) 
-.219 
(.529) 
Ln (Number of 
asylum seekers) 
  -1.728 
(1.187) 
-3.437 
(1.354)* 
Constant     
Time dummy 
variables 
   Included 
R-square 
 
 
 0.175 0.295 0.44 
N 45 45 45 45 
Notes: *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country within parentheses 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.); Eurostat 
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The fifth hypothesis is tested by the use of OLS-regressions including the variables measuring 
policy positions of the major mainstream right and the major mainstream left party on the both 
dimensions in each party system. Looking at table 6.4 the findings show a positive and significant 
effect of the position of the major mainstream right party on the sociocultural dimension 
(MRgaltan). A one step move towards the right would have an impact on the vote of the radical 
right party with 3.27 %. Thus, the results give some support to hypothesis 5. However, as the R-
square value increases when adding the control and time dummy variables this gives an indication 
that major mainstream right party positioning on GAL-TAN doesn’t very well explain variation 
in success of the radical right.  
Looking closer at the control variables, the number of asylum applicants seems to have a negative 
effect on the vote share. This is a result opposite to what was expected and what was shown in 
the logistic regression. The reason behind seems to be major outliers, as there are some countries 
with a very high number of asylum applicants in which the radical right party still has a very low 
support (as is the case with NPD and Germany for example).  
A possible objection to the results in the models is the risk of misclassifying the major 
mainstream parties. Seen in retrospect, when measuring convergence/divergence, in order to 
avoid such problems, I could have looked at the standard deviation of the positioning of all 
mainstream parties instead of computing the distance between the major mainstream left and 
right party. That could have simplified the measurements and increased in the validity in the 
results.   
Summing up the results, I originally expected to find a negative relationship between convergence 
of policy positions of the major mainstream right and left party in a country/party system and the 
success of the radical right. However, my findings when testing hypotheses 1- 4 did not show any 
significant effect or the relationship was opposite to what was expected (as in the case of 
Distgaltan in the OLS-regression). Moreover, a big problem with the logistic regression (which 
turned out showing nothing) was that there was not enough variation in the dependent variable 
used. In this regard, the OLS-regression turned out working better. 
Only when looking specifically at the positioning of the major mainstream right parties a 
relationship could be found with the electoral success of the radical right. The findings shows 
that when a major right party takes a more right position, this increases the vote share of the 
radical right. 
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7. Concluding discussion 
7.1 How may party positioning of the mainstream left and right parties affect the 
success of radical right parties in Western Europe? 
In this thesis I initially sought to explain the relationship between policy positioning convergence 
among the major mainstream parties and the success of radical right parties in Western Europe. 
However, according to the findings in this study, a potentially better explanation is rather to be 
found when looking specifically at the positioning of the major right party on the sociocultural 
dimension. 
Although it, due to shortcomings of the model, makes sense that my hypotheses testing 
convergence were rejected, I still find the results important. According to my non-findings, 
convergence on the economic or the sociocultural (GAL-TAN) dimension does not seem to 
increase the likelihood of having a radical right party. When looking at the sociocultural (GAL-
TAN dimension) and vote share received by the radical right, the results in fact show the 
opposite. When there is an increased distance (divergence) between the major mainstream left 
and right parties on this dimension that has a positive effect on the electoral success of the radical 
right.  
The aim of this study was to look at major mainstream party policy positioning and test the 
theory stating that convergence between the mainstream left and right parties on policy positions 
might open up for influence of far right parties. I did not find proof of the convergence theory. 
However, this is not to say that the findings in my study disconfirms Kitschelt’s theoretical claim. 
Rather the findings find some support for the modified spatial theory presented by Meguid 
(2005) also referred to in the theory section. Looking at the OLS-regression models, the results 
show that when there is divergence on the sociocultural dimension that increases the radical right 
vote share. If the major mainstream left party applies a what Meguid (2005) defines as an 
adversarial strategy towards the radical right party, that increases the saliency of the radical right 
party’s core issue (most likely immigration) this in turn might “force” the major mainstream right 
party (who is probably closer to the radical right party) to compete over the voters and then uses 
an accommodative strategy and takes a tougher stance on the issue. In the long run, when issues 
such as immigration become more salient in the political debate, increased competition from the 
radical right party may result in tougher stances taken by the major mainstream right parties on 
  31 
more polarized issues (such as the ones often included in sociocultural dimension). This may 
have societal consequences since it could result in the mainstream parties legitimizing the issues 
driven by the radical right and at worst, ending up in changed political landscape. Loxbo 
(2014:255-256) also refers to Meguid and take Sweden and the liberalising immigration policy in 
2011 as an example. By adopting an adversarial strategy towards the Sweden democrats, the 
mainstream parties in Sweden increased saliency of the SD’s core issue. Nevertheless, at one quite 
important point – my findings differ with the ones of Loxbo. He finds the biggest risk to be 
convergence but according to my rather modest findings I find it to be polarisation.  
In sum, when trying to understand the success of the radical right the importance of looking at 
the sociocultural dimension cannot be highlighted enough. This study has contributed with new 
evidence by looking at more recent data and a larger group of countries than what has been 
included in the majority of previous research. In line with previous research, it shows that policy 
positioning of the major mainstream right parties on the sociocultural dimension is of paramount 
importance when trying to understand the success of the radical right. 
 
7.2 Further research 
Research has come very far in the field of radical right parties. As it’s regarded as the primary 
basis for this “new” family the sociocultural dimension has already received great attention 
among prominent scholars. Nevertheless, since these parties are becoming increasingly powerful 
political actors, understanding the phenomenon is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, 
more research is still needed in the area. My study (including more recent data and a larger 
amount of countries than many of the previous ones of a similar kind) showed the importance of 
major mainstream right parties’ positioning on the sociocultural dimension when understanding 
the success of radical right. I believe that this should be explored further. What drives what? How 
may different positions taken by the mainstream parties on more polarised issues (such as for 
example immigration) affect the success of the radical right? As already mentioned, in order to 
produce more valid and reliable results, future studies could look at for example standard 
deviation among all the mainstream parties’ positioning on different issue dimensions across 
countries and over time.  
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8.1 Additional data sources 
Eurostat - Unemployment statistics 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2014 
Unemployment rate - % of active population 
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec45
0  (Accessed 160328) 
Eurostat – Asylum applicants statistics 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2014 
Total number of asylum applicants aggregated data  
Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyctz&lang=en 
  35 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en (Accessed 
160509) 
Eurostat – Main GDP aggregates per capita statistics 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2014 
GDP per capita annual change in % 
Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do (Accessed 
160509) 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Overview of variables 
 
Country  Unique identifier for each country 
Codes: 1 Belgium-Flanders, 2 Denmark, 3 Spain, 4 France, 5 Germany, 6 
Greece, 7 Ireland, 8 Italy, 9 Netherlands. 10 United Kingdom, 11 Austria, 
12 Finland, 13 Portugal, 14 Sweden, 15 Belgium-Wallonia 
 
country_name BE-FL, DK, ES, FR, GE, GR, IRL, IT, NL, UK, aus, fin, por, sve, BE-
WA 
YEAR Timepoint of evaluation (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014) 
 
Recoded into dummies for each year 
MRecon 
(0-10) 
Positioning of major mainstream right party on the economic policy scale. 
0 = left 10=right 
MLecon 
(0-10) 
Positioning of major mainstream left party on the economic policy scale. 0 
= left 10=right 
Distecon 
(0-10) 
The distance on positioning between the major right and left party on the 
economic policy scale 
MRGaltan 
(0-10) 
Positioning of major mainstream right party on the GAL-TAN scale. 0 = 
left 10=right 
MLGaltan Positioning of major mainstream left party on the GAL-TAN scale. 0 = left 
10=right 
Distgaltan  
(0-10) 
The distance on positioning between the major right and left party on the 
economic policy scale 
Radical_right_party 
(0;1) 
Existence of radical right party 
Codes: 0 = No radical right party 1= Radical right party  
RR_party_name  
 
Radical right party name  
 
Vote_share Vote of radical right party in national election most prior to Year (see table 
A3 for included parties) 
Unemployment Unemployment rate - % of active population (1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2014) 
 
Ln(asylum)  The natural logarithm of the total number of asylum applicants, aggregated 
data (1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2014) 
 
GDPgrowth GDP per capita annual change in % (1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2014) 
 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.), Eurostat  
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Table A2: List of major mainstream left parties / mainstream right parties included  
Country Major mainstream right party Major mainstream left party 
Belgium 
Flanders 
Christen-Democratisch en 
Vlaams (CD&V) - previously 
CVP 
Socialistische Partij Anders (SPA) -
previously SP 
Belgium 
Wallonia 
Mouvement Reformateur (MR) Parti Socialiste (PS) 
Denmark Socialdemokraterne (SD) Venstre (V) 
Spain Partido Popular (PP) Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) 
France Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire (UMP) 
Parti Socialiste (PS) 
Germany Christlich-Demokratische Union 
(CDU-CSU) 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD) 
Greece Nea Dimokratia (ND) Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (PASOK) 
Ireland Fianna Fail (FF) Labour (Lab) 
Italy Forza Italia (FI)  - in the form of 
PDL 2010 
Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS, 
DS) and after 2010 Partito Democratico 
(PD) 
Netherlands Christen-Democratisch Appel 
(CDA)  
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) 
United 
Kingdom 
Conservative Party (Cons) Labour Party (Lab) 
Austria Osterreichische Volkspartei 
(ÖVP) 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs 
(SPÖ) 
Finland Kansallinen Kokoomus (KOK)  Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen (SDP) 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata PSD 
(previously PPD) 
Partido Socialista (PS) 
Sweden Moderaterna (M) Arbetarpartiet – Socialdemokraterna (SAP) 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.) 
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Table A3. List of radical right parties included (the largest/election, > 1 % vote share)    
 
Country/party 
system 
Radical right party Year  
Belgium Flanders Vlaams Belang/VB All years 
Belgium Wallonia Front National/FN 1999, 2002, 2006 
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti/DF All years  
France Front Naional/FN All years 
Germany Republikaner/REP  
Nazionaldemokratische Partei/NPD 
1999 
2014 
Greece Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos/LAOS  
Anexártiti Éllines/ANEL 
2006, 2010 
2014 
Italy Alleanza Nazionale/AN 1999, 2002, 2006 
Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn/LPF 
Partij voor de Vrijheid/PVV 
2002 
2006, 2010, 2014 
United Kingdom UK Independence Party/UKIP 2006, 2010, 2014 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs/FPO All years 
Finland Perussuomalaiset/PS 2006, 2010, 2014 
Sweden Ny Demokrati/NyD 
Sverigedemokraterna/SD 
1999 
2010, 2014 
Source: 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trendfile (Bakker, et al. 2015.) 
 
 
Table A4: The ideological questions asked to experts in CHES expert surveys  
 
LRECON= Position of the party in YEAR in terms of its ideological stance on economic 
issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties 
on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. 
Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: 
privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner 
welfare state. 0 = extreme left 5 = center 10 = extreme right 
 
GALTAN=  
 
Position of the party in YEAR in terms of of their views on democratic freedoms 
and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal 
freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or 
greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often 
reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the 
government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. 0 = 
Libertarian/Postmaterialist 5 = center 10 = Traditional/Authoritarian 
 
Source: Bakker, et al. 2015. 
 
